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I. INTRODUCTION
Conventional wisdom among practicing mediators is that the confi-
dentiality of mediation should be protected by a statutory or court-
created privilege.' The claims for expanded positive law protection of
party-party and party-mediator communications is based upon the pur-
ported necessity of such confidentiality for the success of mediation,2
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As the title indicates, the views expressed in this paper are very much my own. For a
similar yet independently conceived treatment of the same subject, see the forthcoming
book N. ROGERS & R. SALEM, A LAW STUDENrS GUIDE TO MEDIATION AND THE LAW
(forthcoming Matthew Bender 1987).
1. Dauer, Report of the Committee on Confidentiality in ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION. Center for Public Resources (October, 1985) 98 HARV. L. REV. 441, 452
(1985) [hereinafter cited as Dauer]; Freedman, Confidentiality: A Closer Look, in ME-
DIATION AND THE LAW: WILL REASON PREVAIL?, ABA Special Committee on Dispute
Resolution, 68, 84 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Freedman].
2. Claims for the need for a mediation privilege are characterized both by the
forcefulness of their assertion and the dearth of evidence to support such assertions. See,
e.g., Dauer, supra note 1, at 445: "effective mediation demands that the parties be
privileged not to testify about communications they have made to each other in the course
of mediation." Dauer, supra note 1, at 2: "[a]ssurances of confidentiality are essential.
In their absence, unrestricted dialogue is unlikely and the attractiveness of ADR is
dimiished "; Friedman, Protection of Confidentiality in the Mediation of Minor
Disputes, II CAP. U. L. REV. 181, 196 (1982) in CONFIDENTIALITY IN MEDIATION: A
PRACTITIONERS GUIDE 13, 28 (ABA, 1985): "The importance of confidentiality in programs
established for the mediation of minor disputes cannot be over-stated. Confidentiality is
essential to achieve the full cooperation of participants and, consequently, the integrity
and ultimate success of the program." Murphy, Mediation and the Duty to Disclose,
ABA Special Committee on Dispute Resolution, June 1984 id. at 87: "Assunng participants
in a mediation program that their statements will be held in strict confidence by the
mediator is a crucial ingredient for the successful resolution of disputes through mediation
or arbitration. A guarantee of confidentiality promises the honest airing of grievances by
the disputants which enables the mediator to discover the true sources of conflict." Restivo
and Mangus, ADR: Confidential Problem-Solving or Every Man s Evidence? id. at 143:
"It is universally recognized that in order for non-judicial settlement discussions and other
ADR mechanisms to work, they must be conducted in a spirit of candor and in such
fashion that anything said or done during the discussions will not cause jeopardy to any
of the parties should there be subsequent litigation."
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.and on claims that the social utility of such a privilege outweighs its
costs.,
This Article critically examines the arguments for an expanded sta-
tutory or common law mediation privilege. I take the heretical position
among mediators in arguing that the current campaign to obtain a
blanket mediation privilege rests on faulty logic, inadequate data, and
short-sighted professional self-interest. Neither the necessity for such a
privilege nor the social utility of a general mediation privilege have
been demonstrated. Moreover, an adequate degree of confidentiality in
mediation can be obtained with only slight changes in current laws.
Extension of confidentiality protections through the enactment of a new
privilege statute may well be counterproductive to the goal of increased
acceptance of private dispute resolution. Such an extension will also
frustrate other important social and legal policies, such as the enforce-
ment of restraints on illegal business conspiracies and combinations, the
protection of individual rights, and the enforcement of the criminal law.
The first part of this Article identifies various situations in which
claims of mediation confidentiality may .arise, and isolates several dif-
ferent factors that must be taken into account when assessing a specific
claim of confidentiality. This analysis reveals that the problem of me-
diation confidentiality is more complex than it may initially seem.
Nevertheless, it is possible to identify a paradigm situation, or core
case, in which confidentiality is important, necessary, and appropriate.
Two hypothetical cases, one from the divorce context and one from the
business context, demonstrate the scope of the paradigm situation in
which confidentiality should be accorded and, conversely, the limits
outside of which confidentiality should not apply.
The next part describes the current state of the law of mediation
confidentiality, including statutory, case, and rule-based law. The last
part of the paper analyzes current claims for expanded confidentiality
protection and concludes that the enactment of general mediation priv-
ilege statutes is both unnecessary and unwise. Alternatively, I propose
some minor modifications in existing law (specifically, Rule 408 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence) to improve the current legal environment.
Throughout this paper I use the term "mediation privilege" to refer
generically to any proposal which would require confidentiality in private
dispute resolution forums when a third party is involved. In broadest
terms, this definition encompasses all forms of mediation, including the
mini-trial,' "Michigan mediation" (court-ordered arbitration),' environ-
3. Dauer, supra note 1, at 12.
4. The mini-trial is a dispute resolution hybird in which a "neutral advisor" is generally
employed to advise the disputants of the strengths and weaknesses of their respective
positions and assist them in reaching a negotiation settlement. The neutral advisor's advice
follows summary presentations on the legal merits of the case by each party's attorney,
and precedes head-to-head negotiation by each party's nonlegal representative. The mini-
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mental mediation,' divorce mediation,7 ombudsmandry,g mediation of
minor criminal cases as in Neighborhood Justice Centers,9 neutral expert
trial has been used successfully in many complex cases involving businesses and/or
government agencies. See generally S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDER, DISPUTE
RESOLUTION, at 271-79 (1985) [hereinafter cited as DISPUTE RESOLUTION]; BUTLER, USING
THE MINI-TRIAL IN PRODUCT LIABILITY LITIGATION ALTERNATIVES (1983); Davis, A New
Approach to Resolving Costly Litigation, 62 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 482 (1979); E. GREEN,
CPR Legal Program Mini-Trial Handbook, in CORPORATE DISPUTE MANAGEMENT (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Mini-Trial Handbook]; Green, Growth of the Mini-Trial, 9 LITI-
GATION 12 (1982); Green, Marks & Olson, Settling Large Case Litigation: An Alternative
Approach, 11 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 493 (1978).
5. Michigan mediation is really a form of non-binding arbitration in which a three-
member panel hears half-hour presentations by disputants or their attorneys in cases where
the demand for damages falls below a specified jurisdictional amount. The panel attempts
to mediate an acceptable value for the case. If it is unsuccessful in obtaining the settlement,
the panel renders an award which becomes final if neither party objects within a specified
time. An objecting party is entitled to a trial de novo in the regular court system. This
blend of mediation and arbitration, with many variations in form which range along a
continuum from a mediation-oriented model to an adjudicatory model, is in increasing
use across the United States. See generally DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 4, at 225-
43; E. GREEN, The Complete Courthouse, in DISPUTE RESOLUTION DEVICES IN A DEM-
OCRATIC SOCIETY 15 (1985 Chief Justice Earl Warren Conference on Advocacy) [here-
inafter cited as Complete Courthouse]; E. ROLPH, INTRODUCING COURT-ANNEXED
ARBITRATION: A POLICYMAKER'S GUIDE (1984).
6. See DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 4, at 403: "Environmental disputes, though
varied in their form and structure, typically fall into two broad categories - enforcement
and permitting cases. Enforcement disputes arise when a public agency or private group
raises questions about a party's compliance with a particular federal or state law that
establishes specific environmental standards (pertaining, for example, to air or water
quality). Permitting cases involve disputes over the planned construction of new facilities
(such as a dam or a highway)." Susskind, Environmental Mediation and the Accountability
Problem, 6 VT. L. REV. 1 (1981).
7. Divorce Mediation: Divorce Mediation often involves a non-lawyer mediator who
assists a couple in reaching a divorce agreement with wide-ranging legal effects. An
increasing number of lawyers appear to be offering their services as divorce mediators.
The "preferred" model of divorce mediation contemplates that each party will be tradi-
tionally represented by an attorney at some point in the process, but not all mediations
conform to this model. Indeed, some mediators espouse a more therapy-oriented model
in which the involvement of lawyers is discouraged. Divorce mediation in any form poses
serious problems of fairness and mediator accountability which are the subject of lively
debate among practitioners and scholars. See, e.g., DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 4,
at 313-45; Riskin, Toward New Standards of the Neutral Lawyer, 26 ARIZ. L. REV. 329
(1984); FOLBERG, Divorce Mediation - Promises and Problems, (paper prepared for
Midwinter Meeting of ABA Section on Family Law, 1983) reprinted in DISPUTE RESO-
LUTION, supra note 4, at 315-23; HAYNES, DIVORCE MEDIATION: A PRACTICAL GUIDE
FOR THERAPISTS AND COUNSELORS (1981); CROUCH, The Dark Side of Mediation: Still
Unexplored, in ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF FAMILY DISPUTE RESOLUTION at 339-57 (ABA,
1982).
8. The classic ombudsman on the Scandanavian model is an independent and nonpartisan
official of the legislature who reports on the executive department and deals with specific
complaints against public officials. He has the power to investigate and criticize, but no
power to decide disputes or reverse administrative action. See Verkiul, The Ombudsman
and the Limits of the Adversary System, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 845, 846-56 (1975). Today
in America, the ombudsman is generally fouhd within large corporations or educational
institutions and operates as a mediator of employee-institutional disputes. See DISPUTE
RESOLUTION, supra note 4, at 371-87; ROWE, The Non-Union Complaint System at M.LT.:
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fact-finding, 0 and so forth. Many of the same confidentiality issues also
arise in private dispute resolution situations involving only the parties
to the dispute," as well as to dispute resolution situations conducted by
public agencies or officials outside of or in addition to their official
adjudicatory function. 2 It will be argued, however, in this Article that
the specific context of the case is important in deciding the validity of
a claim of confidentiality and the scope of legitimate protection. Context
includes the type of case, the facts of the case, and the process in
which the communication is made.
The term "mediation privilege" is used rather than "mediator's priv-
ilege" to emphasize that any privilege that applies to the mediation
process should belong to the parties rather than the mediator. 3 It is
An Upward-Feedback, Mediation Model, 2 ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LITI-
GATION 10-13 (1984).
9. An important component of the resurgence of alternative dispute resolution in the
United States in the 1970s was the use of mediation within neighborhood justice centers
to resolve local problems which otherwise might be processed through the criminal justice
system. The classic example is the assault and battery charge arising out of an argument
between neighbors over the lack of control of a dog. Proponents of this kind of mediation
wvould extend it to more serious cases of intra-family violence and community disorders.
See generally DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 4, at 347-69; FELSTINER & WILLIAMS.
Community Mediation in Dorchester. Massachusetts, (1980) reprinted in DISPUTE RES-
OLUTION, supra note 4, at 351-63; Shonholtz, Neighborhood Justice Systems: Work,
Structure, and Guiding Principles, 5 MEDIATION Q. 3, 10-11, 13-16 (1984); NEIGHBOR-
HOOD JUSTICE: ASSESSMENT OF AN EMERGING IDEA (R. Tomasic & M. Feeley, ed. 1982).
10. Neutral expert fact finders, appointed either under Rule 706, Federal Rules of
Evidence, or selected privately by parties to a dispute, function as promoters of a negotiated
settlement by making a non-partisan finding of a crucial technical issue in a case in which
the outcome depends to a large extent on that issue. See generally DISPUTE RESOLUTION.
supra note 4, at 293-98; "Complete Courthouse," supra note 5.
II. Mediation in most important respects is merely "negotiation plus." The "plus" is
the neutral intervenor who adds elements to the process of negotiation designed to overcome
negotiation impasse. See generally DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 4, at 545-48; H.
RAIFFA. THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION, 218-34 (1982).
12. See generally Galanter, The Emergence of the Judge as a Mediator in Civil
Cases, 69 JUDICATURE 257 (1986); Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses
and Abuses of the Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 485 (1985).
For an earlier version of this paper, see DISPUTE RESOLUTION DEVICES IN A DEMOCRATIC
SOCIETY 83 (1985 Chief Justice Earl Warren Conference on Advocacy).
13. By belonging to the parties, I mean that it is the parties who control the power
to waive the privilege and to require others to assert and abide by the privilege. Cf.
Proposed, but not enacted Rule 503(c), FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE [hereinafter cited
as FRE], providing that the lawyer-client privilege belongs to the client rather than the
lawyer, but that the lawyer may claim it on behalf of the client. The Advisory Committee's
Note to this section states, "It is assumed that the ethics of the profession will require
him to do so [assert the privilege] except under most unusual circumstances."
Florida and Arkansas statutes adopt the approach that the privilege is the parties'
rather than the mediators'. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 749.01(3) (West Supp. 1983); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 81-129 (Supp. 1983). This approach is consistent with the English common
law privilege for domestic conciliation. But see Protecting Confidentiality, supra note 2,
at 445-46, stating that "the mediator's status as a neutral demands recognition of a distinct
privilege on his part .... This Note, however, confuses the requirement that the mediator
respect the parties' privilege by asserting it on their behalf (the inverse of the
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the parties' interest in private dispute resolution that is the justification
for the process in the first place. A persuasive case has yet to be made
that an individual mediator's desire to avoid being called as a witness
during a trial deserves any greater recognition than the normal desire
of any person, whether percipient witness or professional consultant, to
avoid being involuntarily drawn into a court battle. On the other hand,
the general process of mediation, over the long run, may require that
the mediation be separated from and protected against adjudication, so
that even if all the parties to mediation are willing to dispense with
the confidentiality and inadmissibility of mediation, the law would not
permit information from the mediation to be used in court."' Recognition
of a privilege in this situation is based on an institutional concern for
mediation as an important and distinct resolution process, rather than
a concern for the mediators' own professional interests. The term "me-
diation privilege" is broad enough to encompass situations in which the
parties seek confidentiality and where the mediation proceeding should
be insulated from adjudication or other processes (e.g., investigation,
legislation, other mediation).
II. UNPACKING THE PROBLEM OF CONFIDENTIALITY IN MEDIATION
A major problem with current proposals to expand legal protection
for mediation confidentiality is their failure to recognize the complexity
of the issue. There are at least five different sub-issues, each of which
can be resolved in a variety of ways, that greatly affect the scope,
validity, and effects of a claim of privilege. In outline form, these sub-
issues and their possible resolutions are:
A. What does "confidentiality" mean?
1. Inadmissibility at trial. Confidentiality could mean only that
statements or evidence used in mediation and/or the terms of a
settlement are inadmissible in a court proceeding (whether be-
tween the parties to the mediation or between a mediation party
and a third party, or between two third parties). Even though
inadmissible as judicial evidence, such statements, documents, or
facts may be subject to discovery processes.
2. Insulation from formal discovery processes by third parties. This
goes a significant step beyond mere inadmissibility. Most privi-
power to waive the privilege) with the right of the mediator to assert the privilege on
his own behalf. See id. at 456-57 ("[Tlhe mediator should not be allowed to 'waive' his
privilege respecting confidential information without the consent of the parties .... Whether
the mediator will be permitted to assert a testimonial privilege depends on the context
in which he mediates and the consequent nature of the neutrality interest at stake.").
14. See Mini-Trial Handbook, supra note 4, at 69.
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leges, including attorney-client, doctor-patient, spousal, and self-
incrimination, are afforded this degree of protection.
3. Enforcement of legal remedies to prevent or compensate for
voluntary disclosure by mediation parties, non-party participants,
and the mediator. At the extreme, a legal remedy to prevent
disclosure would include the ability to enjoin publication of
statements made in mediation, the outcome of the mediation,
and the mere acknowledgment that mediation occurred.
B. What is made confidential?
1. The mere fact of settlement.
2. The terms of settlement.
3. Statements made by the parties in the course of settlement
discussions.
4. Documents and other evidence disclosed by the parties in the
course of settlement discussions.
5. Statements made by or notes of the mediator.
6. The mediator's impressions, opinions, or recommendations.
C. Who can enforce any confidentiality provision?
1. The parties to the mediation.
2. Witnesses or other participants in the mediation.
3. The mediator (any mediator or only certified mediators?).
4. Interested non-participants.
5. Courts and other public agencies.
D. Against whom can confidentiality be enforced?
1. The parties.
2. The mediator.
3. Non-party participants (e.g., witnesses).
4. Private third parties.
5. Public third parties.
E. How absolute should any grant of confidentiality be (what exceptions
should there be)?
1. Absolute (no exceptions).
2. One broad exception when the interests of justice or public policy
requires it.
3. A list of specific exceptions.
It is possible to chart some of these issues to show how they intersect.
Although a multifactor analysis displayed in three dimensions would be
[Vol. 2:1 19861
HERETICAL VIEW OF MEDIATION PRIVILEGE
a more dramatic medium for such a demonstration, the printed page
provides a limit for which the following five charts must compensate.
TABLE I
Extent of Confidentiality
inadmissible nondiscoverable non-disclosure
What
Terms of
settlement ** *
Mere fact of
settlement ** *
Statements of
parties ** *
Documents
Statements and
notes of
mediator ** *
Mediator's
impressions ** *
TABLE II
Extent of Confidentiality
inadmissible nondiscoverable non-disclosure
Who Can
Enforce
Parties to the
mediation **
Witnesses
The Mediator
Interested non-
participants
Courts and
other public
agencies *
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TABLE III
Extent of Confidentiality
inadmissible nondiscoverable non-disclosure
Against
Whom
Parties to the
mediation **
Mediator **16
Non-party
participants *
Priv. 3d
parties *
Pub. 3d parties *
Without considering for the moment any specific exceptions to a con-
fidentiality provision, the above tables give some indication of the
complex interrelationship of the five issues outlined above and the extent
to which analysis of a claim of mediation privilege depends upon the
specific context in which the claim is asserted.
This charting exercise has three purposes. The first purpose is to
demonstrate the sheer complexity of the issue and hence the inappro-
priateness of any blanket mediation privilege. The second purpose, related
to the first, is to emphasize the difficulties inherent in drafting a privilege
statute or exclusionary rule which is precise enough to apply in all cases
where it ought to apply, and not apply where it should not. The third
purpose is to demonstrate that even though a blanket privilege may be
inappropriate, there is a relatively limited core or paradigm situation
in which confidentiality is both needed and appropriate. I have tried
to identify this core situation by marking two asterisks ("**") on the
charts indicating situations within the core. Cases in which a weaker
but possibly valid claim of privilege can be asserted are marked with
one asterisk (""). Where there is no asterisk, no privilege should apply.
I concede at the outset that this charting exercise and the marking
of asterisks in the core situation represent my subjective judgment about
various competing values. My analysis and conclusions, however, are
based on both the traditional approach and the more modern "zone-of-
privacy" approach to privileges." The problem with both of these ap-
15. See infra text accompanying note 17.
8
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proaches, as I have pointed out elsewhere, is their subjectivity, which
permits powerful interest groups to rationalize their claims for what is
essentially guild legislation or elitist cultural values. 6 In spite of the
subjectivity inherent in any analysis of privileges, I have nonetheless
approached the problem with a heavy dose of the skepticism with which
most judges (and evidence professors) greet the call for creation of any
new privilege.'7 Thus the delineation of the core zone reflects both my
subjective views of when confidentiality of mediation should be afforded
recognition and when it is most likely to be afforded recognition through
legislation.
The paradigm case in support of the enactment of a confidentiality
statute is a situation in which (a) one party to a mediation, (b) to
advance its own interests, tries to (c) introduce either the (d) statements
of another party or the impressions, notes, or opinions of the mediator
(e) in subsequent litigation over the same event (f) between the same
parties (g) when the interests of third parties and the public are not
involved. However, as I hope to demonstrate, confidentiality in the
paradigm case is already adequately provided for under current law in
the form of rules of evidence excluding compromises, offers of com-
promise, and statements made in connection with compromise offers,
as well as under rules granting the right of the parties to contract for
confidentiality. 8 Moreover, trying to expand a grant of confidentiality
beyond this core situation may cause a public backlash against this
"secretive" type of dispute resolution. The benefits of a blanket con-
fidentiality privilege are minimal at best, and do not outweigh the
tremendous harm that will result from the public perception that a
mediation that takes place behind a curtain of confidentiality may
produce unfair results.
16. E. GREEN & C. NESSON, PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 519-
26 (1983).
17. See, e.g., United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805 (1984) (accountant's
privilege); In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978).
18. See, e.g., Rule 408, FRE. An example of a state adoption of the Rule includes
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 904.08 (West Supp. 1979) which states:
904.08 Compromise and offers to compromise Evidence of (1) furnishing or prom-
ising to accept, a valuable considertion in compromising or attempting to compromise
a claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not admissible to
prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount. Evidence of conduct or
statements made in compromise negotiations is likewise not admissible. This section
does not require exclusion when the evidence is offered for another purpose, such
as proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention of undue delay,
[proving accord and satisfaction, novation or release,] or proving an effort to
compromise or obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.
[904.08 - taken from the Final Draft Federal Rule 408 which remained identical
to the Preliminary Draft - does not contain the third sentence added to Federal
Rule 408 by. Congress. Wisconsin, however, added the bracketed material].
JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
III. Two HYPOTHETICAL CASES
Two hypothetical cases illustrate the complexity of the confidentiality
issue.
A. Jane Smith v. Frank Smith'9
Jane and Frank Smith have decided to divorce. They have been
married twelve years and have two children, Mary, 7 and Peter, 5.
The Smiths engage Patrick Brave, an experienced divorce mediator,
to help them work out a separation agreement covering custody and
property issues. During mediation, Jane admits to Patrick during a
private session that she does not really want custody of the children,
but is only using the custody issue as a device to get a better property
settlement. In addition, Jane tells Patrick that the children might be
better off with Frank because she doesn't seem to be able to control
herself with the children very well; she has lost her temper with them
on a number of occasions and found herself hitting them in the face.
She gave Mary a black eye last week.
Later, at a joint session, Jane admits that she is using the custody
issue as leverage for a larger property settlement. Upon hearing this,
Frank gets mad and breaks off the mediation.
Frank's lawyer schedules Patrick's deposition. At Patrick's deposition,
the lawyer asks Patrick to repeat what Jane has told him about her
interest in custody of the children and about her feelings with regard
to the best interest of the children. Frank's lawyer also asks Patrick if
he has any information or opinions about what would be in the best
interest of the children. At trial, Patrick is called as a witness by Frank's
lawyer and asked the same questions.
Jane obtains custody of Mary and Peter. Six months later, at the
request of Mary's second grade teacher, the Department of Social
Services conducts an investigation into Jane's treatment of the children.
The DDS social worker asks Patrick what he knows about Jane's care
and treatment of the children.
B. Pipeco, Inc. v. Northwest Power Co?
Pipeco, Inc. sued Northwest Power Co. for $10 million in damages
arising out of Pipeco's contract to supply and erect the piping at
Northwest's new generating facility. Pipeco alleges that changes ordered
by Northwest and delays caused by Northwest increased the cost of its
work by that amount. Northwest counterclaimed for $22 million in
damages it allegedly sustained because of rigged bidding by Pipeco and
19. Based on problem in DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 4, at 343 (question d).
20. !d. at 278 (question 1).
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other contractors on the new facility. The case has been in litigation
for nearly three years and both sides have already spent more than half
of the $2 million each expects to pay in legal and expert fees through
trial, which is not scheduled for another year and a half.
The presidents of Pipeco and Northwest, although friendly, were
unable to resolve the case privately. At in-house counsel's suggestion,
they held a mini-trial. After the mini-trial, the neutral advisor informed
the executives that, in her opinion, Pipeco is likely to recover close to
the $10 million claimed, and recommended settlement in that range.
During the subsequent negotiations between the presidents of the two
companies, Northwest's president conceded that Northwest was respon-
sible for from $4 to $6 million of Pipeco's damages, but refused to pay
any more than that in settlement, and the litigation went forward.
Later, during the discovery phase of the case, Northwest's lawyers
attempted to depose executives of Pipeco and two of its major com-
petitors, Constructo, Inc. and Erectors, Ltd., concerning their bidding
and pricing practices. In particular, Northwest's lawyers wanted answers
to questions concerning an unfair competition lawsuit between Pipeco,
Constructo, and Erectors (the "Piping Company Litigation") that was
settled through private mediation about a year before bids were submitted
on the Northwest project. It is Northwest's contention that the settlement
of the Piping Company Litigation involved the establishment of illegal
market divisions, group boycotts, and price fixing, which adversely
affected the cost of the Northwest facility. Pipeco, Constructo, and
Erectors' lawyers consistently refused to allow their executives to answer
any questions relating to the settlement of the Piping Company Litigation
on the grounds that it involved private mediation. Pipeco's lawyers also
moved to quash a subpoena issued to Mark Jonathan, the well-known
dispute resolution consultant, who successfully mediated the Piping
Company Litigaton.
At the Pipeco -v. Northwest trial, Pipeco sought to introduce the
following evidence:
(i) Certain statements made by Northwest's witnesses during the
failed mini-trial;
(ii) Statements made by Northwest's president during the post-mini-
trial negotiations conceding $4-$6 million responsibility;
(iii) The testimony of the neutral advisor (whom Pipeco subpoenaed)
that, in her opinion, Northwest was liable for approximately $10
million.
Suppose that the Pipeco-Northwest mini-trial had been successful and
the parties settled for an $8.5 million payment to Pipeco. Subsequently,
Northwest petitioned the Public Service Commission (PSC) for a rate
increase. Northwest's petition included the $8.5 million payment to
Pipeco as well as the $22 million in additional costs it incurred allegedly
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as a result of unfair bidding practices by the piping companies. At a
brief hearing before the PSC, at which the neutral advisor's opinion
was read into the record by the attorney for Northwest, the requested
rate increase was approved. Later, "NWPIRG", a public interest group,
challenged the rate increase in court. Lawyers for NWPIRG sought to
compel the neutral advisor to testify to the reasons for her opinion and
to produce her notes from the mini-trial reflecting her impressions of
the parties' presentations.
The Smith and Pipeco cases raise difficult questions concerning a
mediation privilege. In the Smith case, one party seeks to discover and
introduce at trial damaging statements made by the other party during
mediation. Some of those statements were made during an ex-parte
caucus, others in a joint (but still private) session. In addition, one side
seeks to discover and introduce as evidence the impressions and opinions
of the mediator. Moreover, the issue at stake involves the separate
interests of third parties (the children) as well as the interests of the
parties to the mediation. Finally, a public agency charged with protecting
the interests of the children, in order to fulfill its statutory obligations,
seeks to discover mediator knowledge gained during the mediation.
In the Pipeco case, one party to private litigation based on a federal
statute implementing important public policy objectives (enforcement of
anti-trust laws) seeks to discover clearly relevant information about an
earlier mediated settlement to which it was not a party. This party
seeks to discover such information from both the party participants in
the earlier mediation, and the mediator.
Second, one party to the lawsuit seeks to introduce statements made
by witnesses and by the other party at an earlier, unsuccessful attempt
to mediate the current dispute by mini-trial. The same party seeks to
introduce at trial the opinion of the neutral advisor from the mini-trial.
Finally, in a variation on the case, a non-party purporting to represent
the public interest seeks to introduce at a regulatory hearing the impres-
sions and notes of the neutral advisor from a successful mini-trial, after
one of the parties has introduced the formal opinion of the neutral
advisor in support of its request for favorable regulatory treatment.
Of these hypothetical cases, the only situation that arguably falls
within the paradigm case for confidentiality is Pipeco's attempt to
introduce at trial evidence of its claim against Northwest from the
Pipeco-Northwest mini-trial. Even this situation is not clearly within the
paradigm case for confidentiality because the nature of the case and
the nature of the parties - an anti-trust action involving a regulated
utility - both involve the public interest. All of the other hypothetical
situations are clearly outside the core case for confidentiality because
they involve (a) discovery rather than admissibility of evidence, (b)
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non-parties to the mediation, or (c) interests clearly public in nature
(i.e., abuse of children, utility rates).
How much confidentiality will be accorded in these situations under
current case, rule, and statutory law? What should be the scope of
protection in these cases? Are the limits of the paradigm case set too
narrowly? These questions are discussed below.
IV. CONFIDENTIALITY OF MEDIATION TODAY
In the past few years, a flurry of proposals have been made regarding
statutory privileges for mediation." Confidentiality statutes in one form
or another now exist in at least fourteen states,12 three of which provide
an absolute or blanket privilege.23 Before considering these recent sta-
tutory developments, however, it is helpful to understand the scope of
confidentiality afforded mediation in the absence of an explicit privilege
statute.24
A. Exclusion of Settlement Offers and Statements Under Evidence
Rules
Basic protection against the admissibility of statements made in the
course of mediation is provided by the traditional rule of evidence
excluding offers of compromise and statements made in connection with
offers. At common law= and in virtually every jurisdiction today,26
compromise offers are inadmissible when offered at a later trial to prove
21. See generally Freedman, supra note 2, at 68-99; Dauer, supra note 1, at 452-57.
22. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-128 (Supp. 1985); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1747 (West
1982); CAL. LABOR CODE § 65 (West 1971); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-307 (Supp. 1985);
CONN. GEN. STATE ANN. § 31-100 (West Supp. 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. § 90.14 (West
1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 44.201(5) (West Supp. 1986); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §
552.513(3) (West Supp. 1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-3-101 to 116 (1975); N.H. REV.
STATE ANN. § 1273:18 (1977); N.Y. STAT., Civil Service Law § 205.2(b) (CLS Supp.
1985); N.Y. (JUD. LAW) STAT. § 489-b(6) (CLS 1983); N.Y. STAT., Labor Law § 754(3)
(CLS 1983); N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 19 § 12-(3.4), (3.5) (Supp. 1982); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 95-36 (Nov. 1985); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1805 (Supp. 1985); OR. LAWS C. 892 § 88
(REV. STAT. 107.600, 1981).
23. E.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1152.5 (West 1986); M.G.L. c. 233 § 23C (1986).
24. See Mini-Trial Handbook, supra note 4, at 63.
25. See, e.g., Laudati v. Liberatore, 51 R.I. 282, 154 A. 120 (1932). See generally
8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285 (McNaughton rev. 1961); Waltz & Hurton, The Rules
of Evidence in Settlement, 5 LITIGATION 11 (1978) ("Courts at common law consistently
ruled that offers to settle a disputed claim by compromise were inadmissible when offered
at a later trial to substantiate the plaintiff's claim."); C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, § 274 at 663 (2d ed. 1972).
26. See generally 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER. WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 408[8]
(Supp. 1986). States which have adopted Rule 408 verbatim or virtually verbatim include:
Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
South Dakota, Utah, Washington and West Virginia. Substantially similar rules exist in
Alaska, California, Florida, Kansas, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico,
Wisconsin, Wyoming, Texas, Vermont and Puerto Rico.
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liability for or invalidity of the claim in question or its amount. Although
the same protection was not always extended to collateral statements
and conduct occurring during settlement talks,27 the rule of exclusion
in most jurisdictions today is broad enough to cover all conduct and
statements made during settlement talks.28 In addition, many of the gaps
in the evidence rule of exclusion may be filled by contractual provisions
expanding and clarifying the scope of confidentiality.29
Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is based on the common
law rule and is typical of the modern codified approach. It provides:
Evidence of (I) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2)
accepting or offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in
compromising or attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed
as to either validity or amount is not admissible to prove liability for or
invalidity of the claim or its amount. Evidence of conduct or statements
made in compromise negotiations is likewise not admissible. This rule does
not require the exclusion of any evidence otherwise discoverable merely
because it is presented in the course of compromise negotiations. The rule
also does not require exclusion when the evidence is offered for another
purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing a
contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal
investigation or prosecution?0
The policy behind excluding compromise offers and related statements
is twofold: (1) such evidence is of questionable relevance to the sub-
stantive issues because offers and settlement talks may imply nothing
27. See Hatfield v. Max Rouse & Sons Northwest, 606 P.2d 944, 950 (Idaho 1980)
("in the past ... if a statement of fact, as opposed to one of opinion, were made in the
course of settlement negotiations it would be admissible in evidence unless prefaced by
language such as 'for the purposes of argument only,' or 'without prejudice.' "); Gallagher
v. Viking Supply Corp., 411 P.2d 814, 819 (Arizona 1966) ("The determining factor is
the form of the statement, whether it is explicit and absolute. If its purpose is to declare
a fact really to exist, rather than to concede a fact hypothetically in order to effect a
settlement, the statement is admissible."); S. Leo Harmoney, Inc. v. Binks Mfg. Co., 597
F. Supp. 1014, 1023 (D.C.N.Y. 1984) ("At common law, use of the prefatory and 'magic'
phrase 'without prejudice' clearly indicated that the statement was being made in the
course of compromise negotiations. Under FRE 408, employment of this common law
phrase is no longer dispositive.").
28. See Central Soya Co. v. Epstein Fisheries, 676 F.2d 939, 944 (7th Cir. 1982)
("Rule 408 excludes evidence of compromises and offers to compromise, and of 'statements
made in compromise negotiations'."); Cates v. Morgan Portable Building Corp., 780 F.2d
683, 691 (7th Cir. 1985) ("Statements made in settlement negotiations are not admissible
to establish a party's liability, or damages, in the dispute that was the subject of the
negotiation."); Fidelity & Deposit Co. of MD v. Hudson United Bank, 493 F. Supp. 434,
445 (D.N.J. 1980) ("Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of Evidence clearly prohibits admission
of compromises and offers of compromise to prove liability for or invalidity of a claim
or its amount.").
29. See text accompanying notes 31-41.
30. Rule 408 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence is identical to FRE 408 except that
it does not contain the third sentence of FRE 408, which was added by the House of
Representatives to the rule proposed by the Supreme Court.
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more than a desire for peace, rather than an admission of liability; and
(2) the law favors voluntary, informal resolution of private disputes.
Thus, the Rule creates a quasi-privilege for specifically defined conduct.
A few observations concerning this Rule are in order. First, the Rule
covers successful (i.e., completed) settlement talks as well as unsuccessful
negotiations. This means that evidence presented in one case regarding
an offer, settlement discussions, or a completed settlement is inadmissible
in a later case.? Second, it explicitly covers all collateral statements
and conduct. 2 Third, there are exceptions to the general rule of exclusion.
If settlement offers or statements are offered for a purpose other than
proving liability for or invalidity of the claim or amount, they are not
excluded by the Rule.3 The Rule lists three specific exceptions, but
these are only exemplary, not exhaustive, of the permissible uses of
such evidence. Because of the open-ended nature of the exceptions, it
is unclear whether statements made during settlement discussions may
be used for impeachment purposes.' The tendency seems to be to allow
31. See Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Miller, 402 F.2d 134, 139 (8th Cir. 1968) (It is
proper to ask a claims investigator generally about his occupation and interest in the
case, but "his intent and activities in. this case regarding settlement would be inadmissible
as a matter of legal policy to show an offer was made or steps were taken in an attempt
to settle the claim.").
32. See Ramada Development Co. v. Rauch, 644 F.2d 1097, 1106 (5th Cir. 1981)
("The previous common law rule held that admissions of fact made in negotiations were
admissible 'unless hypothetical, stated to be "without prejudice," or so connected with
the offer as to be inseparable from it.' ... The present rule fosters free discussion in
connection with such negotiations and eliminates the need to determine whether the
statement if not expressly qualified 'falls within or without the protected area of com-
promises' the question under the rule is 'whether the statements or conduct were intended
to be part of the negotiations toward compromise.' ") 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER,
WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE %408[3], at 408-21 (1990).
33. See Belton v. Fibreboard Corp., 724 F.2d 500, 505 (5th Cir. 1984) (fact of
settlement by fifteen co-defendants was admissible for purpose of explaining why those
parties were not in court); In re General Mtors Corp. Engine Interchange Litigation,
594 F.2d 1106, 1125 (7th Cir. 1979) (evidence of negotiations admissible on issue of
fairness of partial settlement in class action); Central Soya Co., Inc. v. Epstein Fisheries,
Inc., 676 F.2d 939, 944 (7th Cir. 1982) (evidence of settlement admissible to show partial
forgiveness of primary debt in guaranty case); Brever Electric Manufacturing Co. v.
Tornado System, of America, Inc., 687 F.2d 182, 185 (7th Cir. 1982) (evidence of
settlement negotiations admissible in hearing to set aside default to show defendant's
awareness of claim); United States v. Wilford, 710 F.2d 439, 451 (8th Cir. 1983) (evidence
of settlement stipulation offered to explain circumstances surrounding refunds to certain
non-union drivers, not to show that Local 238 violated the National Labor Relations Act);
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Curt Bullock Builders, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 159, 165 (N.D. I11. 1985)
("When evidence that may implicate Rule 408 is offered for a purpose other than
inpugning the validity of the claim, a court must balance the weight of the policy
considerations behind the rule against the need for the evidence.").
34. See Reichenbach v. Smith, 528 F.2d 1072, 1075 (5th Cir. 1976) ("Rule 408
codifies a trend in case law that permits cross-examination concerning a settlement for
the purpose of impeachment."); Brocklesby v. United States, 767 F.2d 1288, 1293 (9th
Cir. 1985) (indemnity agreement was admissible to attack the credibility of witnesses);
John McShain, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 563 F.2d 632, 635 (3rd Cir. 1977) (evidence
of release was admissible to show bias of consultant's testimony as the release of liability
was in exchange for the testimony).
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the use of statements made during negotiations to impeach the credibility
of one who is not involved in the case in which the statement is offered."
On the other hand, most courts recognize that allowing the parties to
use each other's settlement statements for impeachment purposes would
destroy the Rule, and exclude settlement evidence in this context.3
Fourth, quite sensibly, the Rule does not permit the bootstrapping
of otherwise admissible evidence into the inadmissible category merely
because it is presented at a settlement talk.37 This means that statements
with substantive content made orally or in writing during mediation are
not admissible to prove the substantive content; however, the same facts
can be proved by any other legitimate means. Fifth, the Rule does not
distinguish between evidence offered by third parties and evidence
offered by the parties to the settlement talks.38 Thus, it appears that
statements or offers otherwise within the Rule are inadmissible even
when offered by a third party in a later case. This is the view of the
Advisory Committee. 39 Sixth, the Rule only forbids the admission of
evidence in court. It does not preclude discovery, which may extend
beyond the admissible if the discovery is calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence.' Seventh, the Rule does not say
anything about mere disclosure outside of court of offers or settlement
35. Esser v. Brophy, 212 Minn. 194, 3 N.W.2d 3 (1942).
36. Estate of Spinosa v. International Harvester Co., 621 F.2d 1154, 1158 (Ist Cir.
1980) ("[D]istrict judge properly rules that the agreement could not function to impeach
Thomas Spinosa's testimony, since Spinosa was asked at trial and testified, to the fact
that he had been sued in state court.").
37. See Bottaro v. Hatton Associates, 96 F.R.D. 158, 160 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) ("Rule
408 would not immunize documents or factual admissions merely because they were
exchanged in the course of negotiating a settlement... if they are independently admissible
either as pre-existing documents or 'provable by evidence other than conduct or statements
that make up compromise negotiations.' ").
38. See Young v. Verson Allsteel Press Co., 539 F. Supp. 193, 195 (D.C. Pa. 1982)
(Court did not allow evidence of plaintiff's settlement with a former co-defendant); McHann
v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 713 F.2d 161, 166 (5th Cir. 1983) (Plaintiff's settlement
with two defendants in contract action not admissible at trial of remaining defendants);
United States v. Contra Costa County Water District, 678 F.2d 90, 92 (9th Cir. 1982)
(in suit by United States against water district for cost of erecting wall necessitated by
actions of landowner, evidence of settlement between United States and landowner not
admissible.).
39. The Advisory Committee Notes state, "[wlhile the rule is ordinarily phrased in
terms of offers of compromise, it is apparent that a similar attitude must be taken with
respect to completed compromises when offered against a party thereto." The latter
situation will not, of course, ordinarily occur except when a party to the present litigation
has compromised with a third person. See Mclnnis v. A.M.F., Inc., 765 F.2d 240, 247
(1st Cir. 1985) ("If the policies underlying Rule 408 mandate that settlements may not
be admitted against a defendant who has recognized and settled a third party's claim
against him, it is axiomatic that those policies likewise prohibit the admission of settlement
evidence against a plaintiff who has accepted payment from a third party against whom
he has a claim.").
40. FRE 408 speaks only in terms of inadmissibility; FRCP 26(b)(1) states that the
scope of permissible discovery is not limited by what is admissible at trial. See United
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statements. Eighth, although there are few cases on point as yet, Federal
Rule 408 and similar state rules should apply to negotiations facilitated
by a neutral third party, just as they apply to two-party negotiation.4'
Statements made in the context of mediation are part of compromise
negotiations, and nothing in the Rule excludes facilitated negotiations
from its coverage.
B. Exclusion and Nondiscoverability of Settlement Offers and State-
ments by Contract
Because of the limited scope of the evidentiary exclusion rule and
uncertainty as to its application in problematic cases (e.g., impeachment,
subsequent litigation, etc.), many parties to negotiation and mediation
attempt to clarify the confidential nature of the process by agreement.
This agreement often takes the form of a few words by the lawyers
agreeing that the conversation is "without prejudice" or "for settlement
only." In more highly structured negotiations, multi-party negotiations,
and mini-trials, the agreement usually is reduced to writing and made
a part of the mediation or mini-trial agreement.
Generally, contractual provisions incorporating a dispute resolution
confidentiality clause have two main purposes. The first is to explicitly
call into play Rule 408 or its state counterpart, in order to lay to rest
any doubts in a later judicial proceeding that the parties understood
and intended the evidence rule to apply. The second purpose is to clarify
the uncertainties and fill in the gaps in the evidence rule by directly
addressing uncertain areas, such as impeachment, discoverability, non-
disclosure, use in later cases, and remedies for a breach of the agreement.
Careful drafting of a confidentiality clause in a mediation or mini-
trial agreement is necessary because of the uneven and incomplete
coverage of the evidence rule. For example, some courts might not apply
the rule to mediation because they mistakenly perceive mediation to be
a variant of arbitration rather than a private process of facilitated
negotiation. By referring explicitly to Rule 408 in a written mediation
agreement, the parties maximize the likelihood of receiving Rule 408
coverage. Also, because the mediator's notes, impressions, and opinion
may be among the most tempting items of evidence to try to obtain or
States v. Reserve Mining Co., 412 F. Supp. 705, 712, affd and remanded on other
grounds, 543 F.2d 1210, on remand, 531 F. Supp. 1248 (D.C. Minn. 1976) ("The purpose
of the privilege surrounding offers of compromise is to encourage free and frank discussion
with a view toward settling the dispute. It is not designed to shield otherwise discoverable
documents, merely because these documents represent factual matters that might be or
are incorporated in a. settlement proposal."); NAACP Legal Defense and Educational
Fund, Inc. v. United States DOJ, 612 F. Supp. 1143, 1146 (D.D.C. 1985) (allow discovery
of letters from adversaries in past litigation with DOJ to the agency - FOIA; FRE 408
"was never intended to be a broad discovery privilege.").
41. EEOC v. Air Lines Ass'n., 489 F. Supp. 1003, 1008 n.4 (D. Minn. 1980)-rev'd
on other grounds, 661 F.2d 90 (8th Cir. 1981).
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introduce in litigation, 2 and because these items are less clearly covered
by the Rule, the mediation agreement should explicitly tie the mediator's
statements, notes, impressions, and opinion into the settlement process.
A mediation agreement incorporating such language might state:
This entire process is a compromise negotiation. All offers, promises,
conduct and statements, whether oral or written, made in the course of
this mediation by any of the parties, their agents, employees, experts and
attorneys, and by the mediator, who is the parties' joint agent for purposes
of these compromise negotiations, are confidential. Such offers, promises,
conduct and statements are subject to FRE 408 and are inadmissible for
any purpose, including impeachment.
Not only should this clause clearly call the evidence rule into play, it
also addresses the ambiguity in the Rule concerning impeachment by
making such evidence inadmissible for "any purpose, including im-
peachment." Whether this attempt would be successful if challenged in
a particLlar context is uncertain; however, it may prove effective, given
the general judicial tendency to exclude such evidence when offered
for impeachment purposes. To obtain maximum possible application of
the agreement and the benefit of Rule 408, all the participants in the
mediation, including the mediator and witnesses, should read and ac-
knowledge the confidentiality agreement by signing it.
Neither Rule 408 nor the confidentiality clause set forth above
expressly deal with the discoverability or the prevention of unauthorized
out-of-court disclosure of statements made in mediation. The issue of
discoverability could come up in two contexts. First, a party to an
unsuccessful mediation may attempt in the litigation to "discover"
something said at, prepared for, or offered during mediation. Since the
party will already have all the documents and exhibits in its possession,
he or she may request admissions of facts disclosed at mediation under
Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or alternatively, may
seek to follow-up leads obtained at mediation in depositions or through
42. In traditional mediation-that is, where the mediator perceives her role as simply
helping the disputants to find an agreement acceptable to them without regard for the
mediator's judgment of what would be an optimum or fair resolution-the mediator may
have no notes, impressions, or opinions to discover. See Stulberg, The Theory and Practice
of Mediation: A Reply to Professor Susskind, 6 VT. L. REv. 85 (1981). Not all mediators
practicing traditional mediation share such a minimalist perception of the mediator's role.
See, e.g., Susskind, supra note 6. A diologue expressing the opposing views on this point
can be found in DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 4, at 108-13.
Other forms of mediation, such as the mini-trial, involve the mediator deeply in the
underlying legal merits of the dispute. Indeed, the mini-trial mediator, called a "neutral
advisor", usually is expected to deliver an opinion on the legal merits of the case if either
of the parties requests it. See The Mini-Trial Handbook, supra note 4, at 15. Such an
"evaluative mediator" is likely to have notes, impressions, and opinions of great interest
to the litigants.
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interrogatories under Rule 33 of the Federal Rules. Nothing in the
nature of mediation, the proposed mediation agreement, or Rule 408
would foreclose a party from obtaining useful information or admissible
evidence through regular discovery in this way.
The second way in which the issue of the discoverability of statements
made in mediation could arise is if a third party, in another lawsuit,
seeks to discover what was said and offered at mediation. The Pipeco
and Smith cases present examples of both of these phenomena.
In the Pipeco case, Northwest is attempting to discover what happened
in the Piping Company Litigation mediation, and NWPIRG (the public
interest group) is seeking to discover what transpired in the Pipeco/
Northwest mini-trial. Pipeco is also trying to "discover" facts from its
mini-trial with Northwest. In the Smith case, both Frank and the DSS
are attempting to discover statements made by Jane during the divorce
mediation, as well as the knowledge of the mediator.
Under current law, Northwest, NWPIRG, Frank, and the DSS may
well get their way. Rule 408, even if applicable to third parties, presents
no bar to discovery. Moreover, in most jurisdictions, including federal
court, a matter is discoverable even if it is not admissible so long as
the information sought is calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence or if the information will facilitate settlement. 3 Those conditions
are easily satisfied in our examples, especially when one considers the
public policy importance of the third-parties' claims."
43. FED. R. Civ. P. Rule 26(b)(1) states: "Parties may obtain discovery regarding any
matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending
action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the
claim or defense of any other party ... . It is not ground for objection that the information
sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence... "' See Rozier v. Ford Motor
Co., 573 F.2d 1332, 1343 rehg denied, 578 F.2d 871 (5th Cir. 1978) (an engineering
document which the automobile manufacturer failed to disclose in violation of a discovery
order was not an isolated document but contained referenses to other documents. It was
reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of admissible evidence and therefore satisfied
the rule); Kerr v. United States Dist. Court for North Dist. of Cal., 511 F.2d 192, 196
(9th Cir. 1975), affd, 426 U.S. 394 (1975) (Allowed discovery of personnel files of
members of an administrative agency in a civil rights action. "[U]nder FED. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(I), it is no ground for objection that information sought in pretrial discovery would
not be admissible at trial, 'if the testimony sought appears reasonably calculated to lead
to the discovery of admissible evidence'. .. ).
44. Madden, Drafting Settlement Agreements in Commercial Litigation, 5 LITIGATION
40 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Madden] in the context of traditional settlement negotiations,
makes the following observations:
I have discovered the following reported cases that consider this issue. In Uinita
Oil Refining Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 226 F. Supp. 495 (D. Utah 1964), the
court held that the plaintiff had to answer an interrogatory propounded by a
defendant seeking information on the terms of a settlement between the plaintiff
and the other defendants; in Rohlfing v. Cat's Paw Rubber Co., 17 F.R.D. 426
(N.D. III. 1954), the court held that a defendant was entitled to discover the terms
of a settlement between the plaintiff and the other defendants; in Walling v. R.L.
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Parties wishing to protect themselves against such discovery could
expand the mediation agreement confidentiality clause to preclude dis-
covery as well as admissibility of such evidence. The problem with this
approach, however, is that the parties' agreement cannot bind third
parties such as Northwest, NWPIRG, and the DSS, who were not
parties to the mediation agreement. Moreover, the attempt to preclude
discovery may not even be enforceable against the contracting parties.
It is by no means clear that private parties have the power to alter
judicial discovery rules by agreement. Nonetheless, if a written confi-
dentiality agreement exists, the parties are in a stronger position to
argue that the court should exercise its discretion to grant a protective
order assuring confidentiality because protecting the confidentiality of
mediation statements furthers the expressed intentions of the parties as
well as the public policy of encouraging extra-judicial settlements
C. Public Policy Considerations Favoring Recognition of Mediation
Confidentiality
McGinley Co., 4 F.R.D. 149 (E.D. Tenn. 1943), the court granted the government's
motion under the Fair Labor Standards Act for production of certain settlement
agreements; in Maule Industries, Inc. v. Roundtree, 264 So.2d 445 (Dist. Ct. App.
Fla. 1972), the court held that a defendant was entitled to pretrial discovery of a
"Mary Carter" agreement between the plaintiff and other defendants; and in Cseri
v. D'Amore, 232 Cal. App. 2d 622, 43 Cal. Rptr. 36 (1965), the court held that
where the amount of a settlement would reduce pro tanto the amount of another
defendant's liability, the fact of the settlement may be properly made known to
the jury so the jury may deduct the settlement amount from the total damages
sustained by the plaintiff.
Id. at 59. A review of the above cases reveals that the parties have been very imaginative
in developing plausible legal theories justifying the discovery of settlement agreements.
Consider also the following additional arguments: (1) One of the major purposes of
discovery is to facilitate out-of-court settlements. Knowledge of the amount of the settlement
with other defendants facilitates such settlements. See, e.g., Holliman v. Redman Devel-
opment Corp., 61 F.R.D. 488, 491-92 (D.S.C. 1973); 4 MOORE'S FED. PRAC. 126.02[2]
(1976 Ed. ); (2) a party can also argue that it is entitled to discover the amount of a
settlement when any person who will testify in the trial will come from one of the settling
defendants, citing those cases holding that a jury is entitled to know, as a factor affecting
credibility, if a witness has a stake in the settlement, see Annot., § 61 A.L.R. 395 (1946);
... (5) a creative defendant could argue that the settlement between the plaintiff and
the settling defendants is part of an ongoing antitrust conspiracy, and that the amount
and terms of the settlement should be discoverable to ascertain whether an antitrust
counterclaim is warranted, see, e.g., Bass v. Gulf Oil Corp., 304 F. Supp. 104 (S.D. Miss.
1969) (action taken by antitrust defendant after the complaint is filed may be proper
subject for discovery if relevant); Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koratron Co., Inc., 375 F. Supp.
1, 54 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (the fact that a settlement between competitors is secret does not
prove an antitrust violation, but it may be evidence of an intent to violate the antitrust
laws); and (6) a defendant can argue that the settlement amount is relevant to the damages
question in matters like antitrust cases where the losing defendant is entitled to deduct
from the damages assessed the amount that a plaintiff has received from other settling
defendants. Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368, 397-98 (9th Cir.), cert. denied. 355
U.S. 835 (1957).
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Public policy favoring encouragement of extra-judicial settlements
has been recognized by courts and administrative agencies as grounds
for protecting mediation confidentiality, even when no recognized priv-
ilege exists.
This public policy is incorporated, for example, in the regulations for
the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service which provide as follows:
Production of records or testimony by FMCS employees.
(a) Public policy and the successful effectuation of the Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service's mission require that commissioners and em-
ployees maintain a reputation for impartiality and integrity. Labor and
management or other interested parties participating in mediation efforts
must have the assurance and confidence that information disclosed to
commissioners and other employees of the Service will not subsequently
be divulged, voluntarily or because of compulsion, unless authorized by
the Director of the Service.
(b) No officer, employee or other person officially connected in any
capacity with the Service, currently or formerly, shall, in response to a
subpoena duces tecum, or other judicial or administrative order, produce
any material contained in the files of the Service, disclose any information
acquired as part of the performance of his official duties or because of
his official status, or testify on behalf of any party to any matter pending
in any judicial, arbitral or administrative proceeding, without the prior
approval of the Director."
In a similar vein, federal regulations for the mediation of age dis-
crimination disputes state:
The mediator shall protect the confidentiality of all information obtained
in the course of the mediation process. No mediator shall testify in any
adjudicative proceeding, produce any document, or otherwise disclose any
information obtained in the course of the mediation process without prior
approval of the head of the agency appointing the mediator."
In the case of In the Matter of Tomlinson of High Point, Inc. and
United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America,"7 the NLRB
rejected an attempt to subpoena a conciliation commissioner in a bar-
gaining unit dispute. The Board determined that
If conciliators were permitted or required to testify about their activities,
or if the production of notes or reports of their activities could be required,
45. 29 C.F.R. § 1401.2 (1986).
46. 45 C.F.R. § 90.43.44 (1986).
47. 74 NLRB 681, 685 (1947).
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not even the strictest adherence to purely factual matters would prevent
the evidence from favoring or seeming to favor one side or the other. The
inevitable result would be that the usefulness of the Conciliation Service
in the settlement of future disputes would be seriously impaired, if not
destroyed. The resultant injury to the public interest would clearly outweigh
the benefit to be derived from making their testimony available in particular
cases.4
Voluntary, unauthorized violation of the confidentiality clause of a
mediation confidentiality agreement would not violate Rule 408, but,
assuming nondisclosure was specified in the mediation agreement, this
action would constitute a breach of contract. The problem is in identifying
useful remedies to prevent or compensate for such a breach. One
approach is to try to specify a remedy for a breach in the agreement.
For example, the agreement could provide: "Any violation of this agree-
ment by either party will seriously prejudice the other party, and will
be prima facie grounds for a mistrial or disqualification motion." But
reciting in the mediation agreement that a breach of the rules is "prima
facie grounds for a mistrial or disqualification motion" does not make
it binding on the court, although such provisions may be given weight
by a judge. In any event, a party should be able to recover actual
damages for breach of the agreement. 9 Proving these damages could
be difficult, however, especially to the extent that they are based on
consequential losses. A liquidated damages clause would avoid this
problem if an enforceable clause could be drafted.
A court might specifically enforce a confidentiality clause by granting
an injunction against threatened or further disclosures, but prior restraints
on speech generally bear a heavy presumption against their constitutional
validity. Yet, if disclosure will actually impair legitimate business in-
terests and if the disclosing party agreed not to disclose the information,
it has been held that the presumption may be overborne or the first
48. See also International Assoc. of Machinists v. National Mediation Board, 425 F.2d
527 (D.C. Cir. 1970), the court held that EEOC was not required to produce information
acquired through conciliation efforts under § 706(b) of Title VII. The court stated that
"only by keeping such data strictly confidential can employers be encouraged to discuss
openly and frankly the possible grounds for an amicable resolution of the dispute at
hand." Disclosure, the court felt, "is bound to dissuade candor and even participation by
employers in a negotiated settlement." Id. at 948. See also Burlington Northern, Inc. v.
EEOC, 582 F.2d 1097 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 930 (1978) (disclosure of EEOC
investigative material held to interfere with the agency's ability to obtain voluntary
cooperation with its investigative efforts); Bliznik v. International Harvester Co., 87 F.R.D.
490 (1980) (arbitrator was not required to produce all materials used in reaching his
decision); NLRB v. Joseph Malcaluso, Inc., 618 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1980) (preservation of
mediator effectiveness by protection of mediator neutrality held to outweigh the benefits
derivable from the mediator's testimony).
49. See S. WILLISTON, CONTRAcTS § 1338 et seq. (Jaeger ed. 1968).
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amendment right held to be waived." Despite the constitutional pre-
sumption, injunctions are readily available in trade secrets cases to
prevent the further dissemination of confidential business information."
The party seeking the injunction must satisfy the usual conditions for
injunctions, including showing a "substantial threat of impending injury52
." Much of the information disclosed at a business mediation may
be characterized as a trade secret. Beyond that, however, it may be
argued that disclosure to third-parties of mediation statements, results,
and the mediator's impressions poses a greater threat to the participants
than does disclosure of ordinary trade secrets. In mediation, the disclosure
might not only destroy a business advantage, it could also suddenly put
the party at a judicial disadavantage. Nonetheless, in the absence of
well-developed precedent in this area, participants in mediation should
not assume that injunctive relief will be available to enforce mediation
confidentiality agreements.
D. Public Policy and Protective Orders
Another way to enhance the protection of mediation statements and
proceedings from future discovery is to incorporate the mediation agree-
ment in a court order treating mediation as a hybrid discovery device.
Under FRCP 26(c), the court may "for good cause shown ... make
any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from
annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense."
Under Rule 26(c), the court may order "that a trade secret or other
confidential research, development or commercial information not be
disclosed .... "
Assuming Rule 26(c) would be applicable to a mediation 4greement
incorporated in a court order, the "good cause" requirement would still
have to be satisfied. This requirement has been narrowly construed by
some courts to require a showing that disclosure will work a clearly
defined and very serious injury.53 On the other hand, some courts have
used a more practical balancing test in determining whether to grant
a Rule 26(c) protective order. The factors weighed are (1) the nature
of the proceeding, (2 whether the deponent is a party, (3) whether the
information sought is available from other sources, and (4) whether the
information goes to the heart of the claim.-
50. See National Polymer Products, Inc. v. Borg-Warner, 641 F.2d 418, 424-25 (6th
Cir. 1981).
51. See MILGRIM, TRADE SECRETS, 7.08[I][b].
52. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Continental Aviation & Eng. Corp., 255 F. Supp. 645,
654 (E.D. Mich. 1966).
53. United States v. International Business Machs. Corp., 67 F.R.D. 39, 46 (S.D.N.Y.
1975).
54. Richards of Rockford, Inc. v. Pacific- Gas & Electric, 71 F.R.D. 388 (N.D. Cal.
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In Adler v. Adams," the court relied heavily on a balancing test in
granting a motion to quash a subpoena served upon a mediator in an
environmental case. Under this balancing approach, the party seeking
discovery must show that non-disclosure will lead to serious injury.
Relevant factors include (1) the relevancy of the information the dis-
covering party hopes to elicit, (2) whether the information is reasonably
available from other sources, and (3) how essential such information is
to the preparation of the party's case.
Courts have not been reluctant to allow subsequent litigants access
even to previously sealed court records.16 On the other hand, non-litigant
third-parties have been denied access to information submitted to the
court under protective orders.17
Insulating information and documents from discovery by the govern-
ment may present even greater problems. Under the Hart-Scott-Rodino
Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976,58 the Justice Department may
issue civil investigation demands ("CID's") to any person that the
Attorney General or Antitrust Assistant has reason to believe may be
in possession of documentary materials relevant to a civil antitrust
investigation, requiring that the materials be turned over to the gov-
ernment for inspection and copying. The government's power under this
law to obtain discovery materials covered by a protective order was
upheld in United States v. GAF Corp.9 There is no reason to suppose
that the issuance of a CID for a mediator's notes would be treated
differently.6
Some courts have held that Rule 26(c) protective orders are subject
to constitutional scrutiny, and may have to give way to first amendment
considerations. 61 (Under this analysis, party stipulations fare no better
than court orders.)
One response to arguments seeking to unseal information covered by
a protective order (or even a mediation agreement between the parties)
is that the communications to and from the mediator are akin to work-
1976) (protecting against disclosure of confidential interviews for research project). See
also Baker v. E. and F. Investment, 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S.
966 (1973).
55. No. 675-73C 2 (W.D. Wash., May 3, 1979).
56. See Ex parte Uppercu, 239 U.S. 435 (1915) (Holmes, J.); Olympic Refining Co.
v. Carter, 332 F.2d 260 (9th Cir. 1964). See also Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. E.I. Dupont de
Nemours & Co., 25 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 54, 57 (N.D. Ohio 1977) (agreements between
parties that discovery fruits would be used only for their litigation cannot, in themselves,
bar access by subsequent litigants).
57. See United States v. United Fruit Co., 410 F.2d 553 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 820 (1969).
58. Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383.
59. 596 F.2d 10, 16 (2d Cir. 1979).
60. On this issue see generally Note, Nonparty Access to Discovery Materials in the
Federal Courts, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1085 (1981).
61. See In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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product material. In Hickman v. Taylor,62 the Court first noted that
broad and liberal discovery became limited where "the inquiry touches
upon the irrelevant or encroaches upon the recognized domains of
privilege." While memoranda, notes, and mental impressions of the
attorney were held not to fall within the scope of the attorney-client
privilege, the Court stated that an attempt to compel their production
"falls outside the arena of discovery and contravenes the public policy"63
underlying the peaceful resolution of disputes through mediation. The
mediator, like the attorney, must gather and shift information, consider
strategy, and formulate his advice carefully. To do all this effectively,
the mediator sometimes must record not only information received, but
his own thoughts on how best to use information, and what information
will be used. If these records are open to public scrutiny, the mediator
would be reluctant to reduce confidential communications to writing.
The interest of the disputants in peaceful resolution would be poorly
served by disclosure, if served at all. The court in Adler v. Adams,"
recognized the Hickman analogy, and deemed the mediator's private
communications "protected work product."
In an analagous situation, the Supreme Court of Minnesota recently
upheld the confidentiality of previously sealed settlement documents and
transcripts from an open hearing in which settlement amounts were
disclosed and distributed." At the request of the parties, the civil court
records of settlements in five wrongful death actions brought against
an airline and other defendants were sealed to protect the parties from
harassment and intrusion and to promote the settlement of other actions.
The settlement amounts had been disclosed to the court because under
applicable state law, in a wrongful death action, the trial covrt had to
approve the distribution of settlement amounts to the heirs of the
dpceased. Although this had been done at an open hearing, no one other
than the parties' representatives had been present at the hearing. Thus,
sealing the settlement documents and the transcript of the hearing
effectively shielded this information. A newspaper reporter subsequently
sought to quash the confidentiality order and obtain access to the files,
asserting common law, statutory, and constitutional rights of access to
public records.
The trial court denied the motion to quash, applying a common law
balancing test to the public's right of access to civil court files and
proceedings and the interest of the parties and court, in this case, in
confidentiality of the settlement amounts. The intermediate court of
appeals granted the reporter's -request for a writ of prohibition vacating
62. 329 U.S. 495, 508 (1947).
63. Id. at 510.
64. No. 675-73C 2 (W.D. Wash., May 3, 1979).
65. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Schumacher, 392 N.W.2d 197 (Minn. 1986).
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the confidentiality order.
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, adopting
the common law balancing test used by the trial judge and rejecting
the petitioner's attempt to advance a first amendment constitutional
standard. While the Supreme Court recognized that there is a strong
presumption in favor of acccess to civil court files and proceedings, it
held that in this case the presumption was overcome by a strong
countervailing interest in protecting the settling parties from future
intrusion and harassment, promoting further settlement, and benefiting
the county and court by settlement, rather than trial, of future cases
arising out of the same aircrash." In rejecting a more stringent consti-
tutional standard for the public's right of access to civil settlement
documents and transcripts of settlement hearings, the court noted that
historically, civil settlements have been private and have not involved
courts except for accepting a stipulated agreement dismissing the case.
Courts do not approve, or inquire into the terms of settlement. The
court also observed that the historic privacy of settlements was borne
out by the evidence rule making settlements and offers to settle inad-
missible. Coupled with the public policy in favor of private settlement
of disputed claims, these considerations refuted any constitutional right
of access to civil settlement documents. The court also held that the
fact that the settlements were disclosed to the trial court as part of a
statutorily required distribution approval proceeding did not change
matters because the purpose of the statute was to protect minors, not
to expose settlements to the public."
The result in the Minnesota case is questionable and, I suspect, goes
further than most advocates for a mediation privilege would argue.
Advocates for a mediation privilege emphasize the private and consensual
nature of mediation. In the Minnesota case, the actions of a public
official - the judge - in a statutorily required proceeding, that had
been held in an open courtroom, were veiled with a shroud of secrecy.
If the litigants' interest in personal privacy, and the courts' interest in
promoting out of court settlements, outweigh the public's right to know
what goes on in its courthouses in this case, it is hard to imagine many
instances in which the same balancing will not result. Once a judge is
involved in an open hearing regarding a dispute resolution process, the
claim for confidentiality loses more of its punch.
Notwithstanding one's judgment about the correctness of the result
in the Minnesota case, the important point for these purposes is to
recognize that while exclusionary evidence rules, contractual agreements,
protective orders, and public policy arguments do not provide an airtight
66. Id. at 205-06.
67. Id. at 204-05.
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guarantee of confidentiality in every case, it is evident that courts are
receptive to claims for the need for confidentiality of settlement. In
appropriate cases, courts will protect confidentiality, even in the face
of claims of first amendment rights of access and in the absence of
any mediation or settlement privilege.
E. Mediation Privilege Statutes
Is a blanket mediation privilege statute an improvement on the existing
situation? For the reasons stated above, I believe not. The Massachusetts
mediation confidentiality statute, which was enacted in 1985 at the
initiative of the mediation community, is an example. The act reads: •
All memoranda, and work product prepared by a mediator and a mediator's
case files, shall be confidential and not subject to disclosure in any judicial
or administrative proceeding involving any of the parties to any mediation.
And any communication made in the course of and relating to the subject
matter of any mediation and which is made in the presence of such
mediator by any participant, mediator or other person shall be a confidential
communication and not subject to disclosure in any such judicial or
administrative proceeding; provided, however, that the provisions of this
section shall not apply to the mediation of labor disputes.
For the purposes of this section a mediator shall mean a person not a
party to a dispute who enters into a written agreement with the parties
to assist them in resolving their disputes and has completed at least thirty
hours of training in mediation and who either has four years of professional
experience as a mediator or is accountable to a dispute resolution orga-
nization which has been in existence for at least three years or one who
has been appointed to mediate by a judicial or governmental body. 6
The primary problem with the Massachusetts statute, as with all
statutes of this sort that I have seen, is that it is both over-inclusive
and under-inclusive. The act is over-inclusive because, unlike the attorney-
client privilege, the husband-wife privilege, and the evidentigry exclu-
sionary rule, it contains no exception for bad faith, illegal conduct,
fraud, or any other abuse of the mediation process, nor any exception
when other important values are at stake. Thus, all of the mediation.
and mini-trial related statements in both the Smith and Pipeco hypo-
theticals would be secreted under the terms of the Massachusetts statute,
notwithstanding the strong countervailing public interests. Exceptions to
prevent such results arguably could be inferred by a court, but there
is not a textual hook in the statute on which to peg such judicial
legislation. Moreover, if exceptions are to be inferred on an ad hoc
basis, what is the advantage of a statute that appears absolute but
which, in fact, is subject to case-by-case determination? Would it not
68. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 233, § 23C (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1985).
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be better simply to leave matters to courts to apply a public policy
approach to mediation results and fruits?
The statute is under-inclusive in that it applies only to judicial or
administrative proceedings involving former parties to the mediation.
By implication, an attempt to discover or use mediation results or fruits
in other circumstances is not privileged, even though protection may be
appropriate. The statute is under-inclusive for the further reason that
it applies only to mediation conducted by a "mediator" as the term is
defined in the second paragraph of the statute. To qualify, a mediator
must have certain training and experience and must act pursuant to a
written agreement with the parties. Again, the negative implication is
that mediation conducted by anyone else or without a written agreement
is to be totally discoverable and admissible. Many mediators, such as
internal ombudsmen in corporations, educational institutions, and gov-
ernmental agencies constantly conduct mediation without any opportunity
to enter into a written agreement with the parties. 9 Confidentiality is
probably more important and appropriate for such mediation than other
mediation covered by the statute, yet the existence of the statute invites
judicial interpretation that is not covered, and hence not confidential.
Finally, by tying coverage of the statute to a restrictive definition of
a mediator, the act attempts to set standards of practice and define
who is qualified to be a mediator and who is not. Many commentators
do not believe the field of mediation is ready for restrictive standards
and licensure.1° And if standards of training and experience are going
to be set, it should be done as a part of an explicit standard setting
process, not through the back door as a definition in a privilege statute.
As it is, the definition in the Massachusetts statute smacks of guild
legislation. Indeed, many excellent and experienced mediators would not
qualify under the statute because they have not had thirty hours of
training in mediation. Many of these persons, including myself, have
not had such formal training but have spent hundreds of hours training
others to be mediators as well as practicing mediation before training
mediation was reasonably available.
In sum, attempting to draft an effective mediation statute that protects
what should be protected and exempts what ought not to be protected,
while well-intentioned, is extremely difficult. It is also dangerous to the
practice of mediation because errors of omission can leave parties to
mediation more exposed than before and errors of comission can frustrate
important public interests and, eventually, lead to a backlash against
mediation.
69. See Rowe, The Non-Union Complaint System at M.LT.: An Upward-Feedback,
Mediation Model, 2 ALTERNATIVES To THE HIGH COST Of LITIGATION 10 (1984).
70. See DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 4, at 517-24.
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V. A HARD LOOK AT THE CLAIMS FOR A MEDIATION PRIVILEGE
Can a mediation privilege be justified under traditional privilege
analysis? The classic approach is Wigmore's utilitarian calculus. Starting
from the premise that "the public is entitled to every man's evidence"
and that exemptions from this rule are exceptional and to be dis-
countenanced, Wigmore poses four conditions that must be fulfilled to
justify a privilege:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will
not be disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and
satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community
ought to be sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of
the communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained
for the correct disposal of the litigation."'
This formula contains a dual focus on the instrumental purpose of
the communication and the cost/benefit effect on the trial process.2
Courts are extremely reluctant to recognize new privileges. Wigmore's
approach to the recognition of a new privilege creates four barriers to
successful assertion of a privilege, any one of which may be sufficient
to defeat a claim. For example, in the Watergate Tapes Case,73 the
Supreme Court held that an asserted privilege for Presidential com-
munications, at least in the absence of a statute, failed both the second
apd fourth of Wigmore's conditions. While recognizing that the Presi-
dpnt's interest in preserving confidentiality of communications between
himself and his advisors is "weighty indeed and entitled to great respect,"
the Court nonetheless decided, "[W]e cannot conclude that advisers will
be moved to temper the candor of their remarks by the infrequent
occasions for disclosure because of the possibility that such conversations
will be called for in the context of a prosecution."7 In addition, the
Court concluded that "the allowance of the privilege to withold evidence
that is demonstrably relevant in a criminal trial would cut deeply into
the guarantee of due process of law and gravely impair the basic function
of the courts.""
The Court's conclusion in the Tapes case reflects its generally negative
predisposition to privileges:
71. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2191-92, 2285 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
72. See E. GREEN & C. NESSON, supra note 16, at 520-21.
73. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683-(1974).
74. Id. at 712.
75. Id.
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We conclude that when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed
materials sought for use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized
interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands
of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice. The
generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific
need for evidence in a pending criminal trial.76
Similarly, in Branzburg v. Hayes," the Supreme Court rejected a
constitutionally based common law claim of reporter's privilege, although
some members of the Court were of the view that a qualified privilege
ought to exist in some cases to protect a reporter's confidential sources.
Subsequently, in the Farber case,78 the New Jersey Supreme Court held
that an attempt by the New Jersey legislature to create statutorily a
reporter's privilege had to give way to the sixth amendment right of
confrontation and the New Jersey constitutional equivalent. The Supreme
Court denied certiorari.
In light of these courts' demonstrated hostility to privileges with
claims to constitutional grounding, how would a mediation privilege
fare? A mediation privilege would probably satisfy the first condition
of Wigmore's four-part test. The communications between parties to a
mediation and between the parties and the mediator generally originate
in a confidence that they will not be disclosed, although the circularity
of this condition is obvious. Mediation communications originate in
confidence that they will not be disclosed because that is what mediators
tell parties. If a privilege exists, then this confidence will be justified.
If no privilege exists, then the expectation of confidentiality will be
false and, eventually, neither mediators nor parties to mediation will
engage in communications with the expectation that they will not be
disclosed.
It is doubtful whether a blanket mediation privilege would satisfy
the remaining three conditions. Although most mediators assert that
confidentiality is essential to the process, there is no data of which I
am aware that supports this claim, and I am dubious that such data
could be collected. Moreover, mediation has flourished without recog-
nition of a privilege, most likely on assurance given by the parties and
the mediator that they agree to keep mediation matters confidential,
their awareness that attempts to use the fruits of mediation for litigation
purposes are rare, and that courts, in appropriate instances, will accord
mediation evidence Rule 408 and public policy-based protection. Thus,
although the need for confidentiality in most cases is recognized, the
need for a blanket privilege is not essential.
76. Id. at 713.
77. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
78. State v. Jascalevich (In re Farber), 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330, cert. denied, 439
U.S. 997 (1978).
32
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In addition, there is no consensus that the relationship between the
parties and the mediator ought to be sedulously fostered in all or even
most cases. Clearly, when mediation is used as a mechanism to engage
in illegal or improper activity, as is alleged in the Pipeco hypothetical,
the relationship between the mediator and the parties is not one which
the community would believe should be fostered. For the purposes of
privilege analysis, however, the relationship should not be judged by
aberrant examples. The attorney-client and husband-wife relationship
are abused also, yet there is a general consensus that these are worthwhile
relationships that ought to be fostered. Abuses of the relationship are
addressed by carving out an exception to the privilege, not by denying
the privilege in total. 9
Putting aside clear abuses of the relationship, however, there is a
substantial and respectable body of opinion that holds that mediation
and other informal methods of dispute resolution ought not be encour-
aged. Some critics of alternative dispute resolution contend that although
mediation and similar processes are supposed to be voluntary in theory,
in practice at least one participant may be pressured into the process.
Once in the process, the parties may not be fully advised of the rights
they would have had if their case had gone to court or of their right
to walk away from mediation.w Other critics of dispute resolution contend
that out-of-court settlements are never to be encouraged because set-
tlement, by definition, is always less than justice.8 Others are concerned
that mediation exacerbates disparities of power between the parties,
8 2
or disadvantages certain groups. 3 Finally, some commentators caution
that users of mediation and other forms of alternate dispute resolution
are relegated to "second class" justice while the rich and powerful
preempt the courts."
While I am not persuaded that any of these criticisms make out a
valid case against informal dispute resolution,85 the fact that spch views
are held by even a minority of commentators casts sufficient doubt on
the proposition that mediation ought to be sedulously fosterd .to un-
79. See, e.g., Proposed Rules 503(d)(1) (attorney-client privilege, furtherance of crime
or fraud) and 505(c)(1) (husband-wife privilege, interfamily crime), in E. GREENE & C.
NESSON, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE WITH SELECTED LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND
NEW CASES AND PROBLEMS 269-70, 279-80 (Appendix of Deleted and Superseded
Materials) (1984).
80. DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 4, at 490.
81. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
82. See, e.g., Singer, Nonjudicial Dispute Resolution Mechanisms: The Effects on
Justice for the Poor, 13 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 569 (1979).
83. See Rifkin, Mediation from a Feminist Perspective: Promise and Problems, 2
LAW & INEQUALITY 21 (1984).
84. See, e.g., ABEL, THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE (1982); AUERBACH, JUSTICE
WITHOUT LAW? (1983).
85. See DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 4, at 490-503.
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dermine a claim for recognition of privilege.
Finally, given the unwillingness of courts to strike the balance between
injury to the relationship and benefit to the justice system in favor of
executive privilege and reporter's privilege, it is doubtful that courts
will conclude that the balancing of interests called for by the fourth of
the Wigmore conditions comes out in favor of a mediation privilege. In
the Smith and Pipeco hypotheticals, it seems unlikely that courts would
conclude that the injury to the mediation relationship caused by dis-
closure of the communication would be greater than the benefit gained
for the correct disposal of the litigation, even though these cases, unlike
Nixon and Farber, are noncriminal (and thus confrontation clause con-
cerns are absent). In the Smith case, the state's interest in the care
and protection of children, and in the Pipeco case, the government's
interest in enforcement of the anti-trust laws and fair regulation of
utilities, outweighs the parties' interests in preserving the confidentiality
of the mediation process. In purely private civil disputes, however, where
no particular public interests are present (other than the general public
interest in the correct disposal of litigation), the balance may come out
differently.
Several modern commentators have criticized Wigmore and the Su-
preme Court's approach to privileges as too narrowly based on an
instrumental calculus that values accuracy in the judicial process while
not giving enough weight to other important human values such as
privacy, dignity, intimacy, autonomy, and individuality.8 ' These com-
mentators would base privileges on humanitarian values that depend on
protection of zones of privacy in important human relations, such as
husband-wife, parent-child, and counselor-client.
The utilitarian approach to privileges still predominates over the
humanitarian, but as I have argued elsewhere, neither approach by itself
provides a satisfactory explanation for the recognized privileges and for
the nonrecognition of seemingly similar but unprotected relationships."'
This is because there is more than one type of privilege designed to
accomplish more than one purpose.
There are at least two different kinds of privileges; the type depending
on the relationship between the holder of the privilege and the other
communicant. The first kind of privilege includes those in which a
professional counseling relationship exists between the holder of the
privilege and the other person. Privileges of this kind include the well-
recognized ones of attorney-client, doctor-patient, and communications-
to-clergy, and the generally unrecognized ones of accountant-client, social
86. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 31-39 (1967); Krattenmaker, Testimonial Priv-
ileges in Federal Courts: An Alternative to the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 62
GEO. L.J. 61, 85-94 (1973).
87. E. GREENE & C. NESSON, supra note 16, at 525-26.
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worker, and stockbroker. The ostensible purpose of these privileges is
to foster and promote effective professional services by the counselor.
The second kind of privilege includes those that are designed simply
to throw a veil of secrecy around specific zones of privacy in order to
protect human dignity, individual autonomy, or family. No professional
relationship is involved and no furthering of any service need be dem-
onstrated. Examples of this kind of privilege include the husband-wife
privilege and the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.
These categories obviously overlap. Nonetheless, it is a useful cate-
gorization because asserted privileges designed to foster a professional
relationship can, and generally are, subject to a utilitarian analysis while
those based on a zone of privacy must be justified on other grounds."8
Into which category does a claimed mediation privilege fit? While some
.mediators, especially those who work in the family mediation field and
employ a more therapeutic-oriented kind of mediation, 9 might assert
that mediation promotes individual autonomy, self-development, and
emotional release - humanitarian values on which the zone-of-privacy
based privileges rest - any general mediation privilege seems to fit
more easily into the instrumentalist-based group of privileges because,
at bottom, it is defended as furthering the rendition of professional
services. And, as argued above, if subjected to the four conditions of
the utilitarian test, a general mediation privilege is unlikely to pass
muster.
VI. CONCLUSION
A blanket mediation privilege is a bad idea. Attempts by the mediation
cqmmunity to obtain a statutory privilege may backfire. If the attempt
is successful, an over-inclusive and under-inclusive statute is likely to
be enacted, resulting in the unintended implication that somp commu-
nications that ought to be confidential were not intended to be protected,
and that a backlash of public and judicial opinion against secrecy of
events should not be confidential. If the attempt at enactment of a
mediation privilege is unsuccessful, it may be understood as a rejection
88. This is not to say that the privacy-based privileges are any more subjective than
the professional relationship-based privileges. The instrumentalist approach applied to the
latter has more trappings of objectivity than the humanitarian approach applied to the
former, but neither approach provides a convincing rationale for the system of privileges
that now exists; For the professional privileges, little or no data exists to prove that the
utilitarian calculus justifies any particular privilege, and it is difficult to think how such
data could be obtained. For the nonprofessional privileges, what reasons justify recognition
of a husband-wife privilege but not a parent-child or best friend privilege? A more realistic
(if cynical) explanation for the current system is that privileges rest on relative power
and influence exercised by certain segments of society, that privileges are, to a large
extent, guild legislation. E. GREENE & C. NESSON, supra note 16, at 526.
89. See J. FOLBERY & A. TAYLOR, MEDIATION 130-35 (1984).
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of confidentiality protection for all mediations.
Some confidentiality protection for mediation and other forms of
alternative dispute resolution is appropriate. There appears to be suf-
ficient protection under current law to permit alternative dispute res-
olution to flourish. Working for modest amendment to Evidence Rule
408 to make it clear that the Rule excludes evidence of compromises,
offers to compromise, and statements made in connection with such
offers for substantive as well as impeachment purposes, would be a
better legislative agenda for mediators rather than lobbying for a me-
diation privilege. An expanded Rule 408, coupled with careful drafting
of the confidentiality clause in a mediation agreement where such
agreements are used, 90 and attention to the public policy generally
favoring out-of-court settlements, adequately protects parties to mediation.
90. In situations in which mediation is usually performed without an agreement by
the parties, as by an ombudsman within a university or corporation, a published and
disseminated policy of confidentiality might be an effective substitute in most cases for
a written confidentiality clause.
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